As do I. I consider that there is no "âtma" principle per se, but the so-called âtma (or "Will") principle is an abstract point in metaphysical space which necessarily, always and unavoidably radiates a buddhic aura or presence. These two "together" are a monad, which is (only seemingly paradoxically) a unity at the same time when it is a duad. Rather, it is like the symbol of Sun, a middle point of which is non-existent without the circumference.
That is why there can be no "âtmic" work as separated from Buddhic and Manasic, which are the two hands. There is no third hand; the act of the seeming third part is just the application of the two. In a mystic language, two hands create the third when they join in prayer. (The same goes with eyes.)
Would you enlighten me about your understanding of 'âtma
' as a monad, i.e. the being, or “being“ of this togetherness? It might of be, that I've made a little 'parorama
', though the 'panorama
' of right interpretation as it's ground
is the openness to correct oneself — a problem bit different living people than with books, since living are at least as their ground more open to debate — even if a book might have a more fixed meaning and our knowledge of this is not at it's end like a mere letter, a sublime thought goes beyond words even in mere books, etc.
How do you understand the relationship between a so called human monad and a divine monad? For Blavatsky they seem to differ in that the human “monad“ is rather a “dual Monad
“, i.e. not the monadic monad. A unity which is at the same time a duad, as an abstract
point in metaphysical space
— would an undivided space
of the wherein
of this “abstract“ human dual
-monad be more like the divine monad?
What is mean by a “principle“ here? I mean, for Blavatsky, it seems that for example prâna is the outward differentation of jîva and as
such is a principle, like a sponge in it's relationship to an ocean surrounding it. According to this view, the system of principles is itself an emanation from a still
higher level, which is not a principle, i.e. jîva not as an aspect
and particular application of itself. Blavatsky uses the term 'monad' of jîva, e.g. “Monad (jiva)“.
Then again, I've heard you speak of jîva and prâna both
as principles, even though you still differentiate between them, but also equate them in hte spiritual realm, where they are “in a way“ one, which sounds they're one “as if“, i.e. 'quasi
' one, or “als ob
“ as not re
ally “res postulat
“. Considering Blavatsky's sevenfold scheme you say that âtma doesn't exist as a principle per se
, but is more a like a veil
. You also say, that it's in the middle, i.e. present in all the other principles — but isn't jîva as well as
prâna present in all the other principles?
Even if âtma is a sort of monad and not a principle per se
, do you still consider there's a difference between it and blavatskyan jîva, which also is not a principle in itself, at least for Blavatsky, I think? Do you consider âtma as the togetherness of the “hands“, i.e. paths
, without a third hand or path, still as a way to another monad, i.e. jîva as a more monadic monad? Or is this dual monad as “existent“ for you as monadic as it gets? Are the “paths“ rather existences on their way to non-existence, i.e. quite like aspects have something towards-which (ad
) they as views (specta
) are? This is not me trying to make a 'panorama
' of your
thinking, but it might still matter, since I presume it's not in anyone's interest for me to understand this “point“ wrong even in some formal sense.