Religion and Kant's transcendental schematism

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Alfalfa

Religion and Kant's transcendental schematism

Postby Alfalfa » Sat Oct 20, 2018 3:34 pm

In Kant's most famous book, Critique of Pure Reason (1781), the chapter Of schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding is widely considered to be notoriously difficult. For example, Schopenhauer says of this “wondersome” chapter, “that is famous for its high obscurity, since no-one has ever has been able to make any sense out of it”. Schopenhauer is not an exception, since he tries to explain it based on merely formal reasons, even though it's really the key chapter in Kant's whole philosophy. Credit must be given to Heidegger's immense power of thought, for actually first time interpreting this chapter right both philologically and philosophically.
                         It's quite certain, that Schopenhauer didn't understand this chapter at all, since he calls the a priori pure concepts of understanding here “contentless”, i.e. empty, eventhough the main reason Kant is here discussing is quite the contrary: what specifically constitutes the content of these pure concepts of understanding? To be sure, they are empty from actual objects, but this chapter is about the object a priori, i.e. according to possibility. What's here at stake, is the a priori structure of the possibility of actual objects, as the object a priori, of which the former must precede the latter.
                         So, what is the content of a priori pure concepts of understanding, which serves as the basis for the preceding possibility, according to which an actual object can a posteriori, be given in experience? Let's make some preliminary notions first. The word 'category', according to it's etymological meaning, means 'towards-which'. Kant's meaning for the word is precisely the same and he doesn't here differ from the first one to use this greek word in it's philosophical context, i.e. Aristotle. 'Undestanding' in Kant's sense is the ability to think with concepts and in it's a priori mode, pure understanding thinks “with” categories, or rather is categorical. Understanding is simply towards-which, and categories are it's structures quite like letters A and B are the elements of the syllable AB.
                         Towards-which does not have merely “empty” nothing as the what-content of it's about-which, as Schopenhauer thought, but the question here is centered on the what-content of the a priori categories, i.e. an internal object without a dogmatically assumed external object. This what-content is that which gives categories their unity as the about-which they are as it's belongings, quite like the accidents of a substance. An empty nothing could not give them unity, quite like mere empty nothing can't make syllable AB from letters A and B. It's the form of the syllable as the belonging-together of letters, which make out it's unifying shape. On the other hand, AB could in it's relation to the letters be considered their unifying matter, and Kant means it this way: the about-which is the matter of formal categories a priori.
                         What matters for Kant is, that this content should, as it's a part of a priori philosophy of the internal sense, be given purely internally. For Kant, the philosopher of a priori is not without any object at all. He has the a priori possible form of object, which serves as the a priori possible matter of object. Only together they work as the a priori possibility for the a posteriori actuality of empirical objects. This possibility of an empirical object is indeed a formal one, but as divided to formally-formal and materially-formal.
                         What then is the formal matter of formal form? It is time. A peak in the history of theology and philosophy preceding Kant gives helpful hints at understanding this, even though they're not completely necessary either here. The problems Kant faced through the history of theology and philosophy, or rather the questionable tradition of intertwining both, serves to expose his quite superficial motives for his conception of formal matter as time, since it's not good enough to understand that someone is wrong, but it should also be made an attempt to explain, why he was wrong. Otherwise the reason for being wrong would be merely accidental and not necessary. Great thinkers like Kant should not be suspected of making an accidental mistake, especially when the question is of extreme importance.
                         Kant is here related mainly to three thinkers, two of them theological and one philosophical, all of them huge impact both theologically and philosophically. The two theologians are Luther and Erasmus and the one philosopher is Descartes. Even though Erasmus is not by himself an important theologian, it is his confrontation with Luther which gives him a place in the history of great thinkers. From Luther Kant wanted to save the notion, that natural cognition can't reach any knowledge of God. On the other hand, Kant sided with Erasmus on the question about God's moral commands as revealed through man even without biblical, i.e. historical knowledge, shuch as the person of Christ. Kant tried to give some assent to both sides: to Luther from the side of theoretical use of reason, i.e. pure understanding as the region of nature, and to Erasmus from the side of practical use of reason, i.e. pure reason as the region of moral religion. It should be noted though, that Luther included such moral God in the natural use of reason as the wrath of the hidden un-christian God, “Deus absconditus“. Descartes stood in the way of Kant's theological synthesis, with his ultimately platonic theoretical proof about God. From Kan't ultimately theological perspective, Descartes had to be defeated on philosophical grounds before he could accomplish his great theological synthesis.
                         The main thrust of Descartes' philosophy, against which Kant had determined to invent a solution, even the quite artifical one he finally ended up with, concerns the question about the nature of time. In his famous philosophical theoretical proof of God, Descartes had tried to prove with absolute certainty, that theoretical cognition can't give itself it's own continuity in time. Accordingly theoretical cognition should depend on another principle, which provides that continuity in time. For Descartes, that another principle is God, which provides the theoretical subject's way out of itself, since otherwise it would not have temporal continuity. Descartes's God is here the platonic substance understood theoretically.
                          Kant is probably one of the few people who actually has understood Descartes's proof of God, even though Kant was, in the traditional sense of the word dogmatically against it, because of his ulterior theological motives. This is why Kant out of necessity came up with a different conception of time, which would make the theoretical subject self-sufficient in a way opposed to Descartes. This way there would be no need for a theoretical knowledge of the platonic substance and Luther's view of natural reason's impossibility to know God could be saved. On the other hand, Kant also couldn't accept Luther's view about belief in the historical figure of Christ as God, so he was compelled to make a point for the moral God of Erasmus.
                         These previous historical considerations give us evidence of the superficial motives in the background of Kant's conception of time as the formal matter of the categories of understanding. We'll now unfold Kant's “solution” and it's problem more precisely. First of all, why is the schema of a concept of understanding 'count' (Zahl)? 'Zahl' is not only 'number', but 'count', as if in “taking count”, i.e. “Zahl nehmen”, which means going through the manifold and numbering each one on the way. This numbering is counting and the result , or product of this counting is the count. So, Kant says, that the count by counting considers the counted manifold together as the unity of manifold. This manifold is not first encountered as such counted manifold, but counting must go through this act of counting to work as the unity of the counted manifold.
                         The counting itself, which goes through the manifold, and in a way produces it as the counted for the count, as such is first needed to make it a manifold. Count is a pure schema of a concept of the understanding, only when the counting has gone through and as such produced the manifold to be held schematically as the count of the manifold. The successive addition “from one to one (same of a kind)”, is the formal matter, on which the schema gives unity as a single representation. As the about-which of schema, this succession serves as the matter for the formal concept of understanding. This matter Kant calls a figure, or a picture (Bild). It is necessary for me here only to consider the category of quantity, although succession provides the towards-which also for the other categories, e.g. quality, relation and modality.
                         As an example of the picture, number 3 is quite an abstract concept, which can only be applied to a sensual image, such as 'xxx', but can't as such be made it's sensual image 'xxx', since it could also be presented by other figures, e.g. 'zzz'. What is not as evident is, that since the image is not the same as the concept, there must be something third in addition to the concept and picture, which gives their various relationships unity. This third member is the schema, which works in all images of abstract concepts of pure understanding. Schema gives the picture 'xxx' it's of-what, i.e. as the matter of number 3.
                         So time is the picture of the schema of number and as such works as the matter of the concept of pure understanding, which is a form. Time is the material-form, concept of count the formal-form, and transcendental schema the unifying transcendental judgement between both. In this particular transcendental judgement, the 'count' considered as a whole, is the concept of pure understanding applying through transcendental a priori judgement, or transcendental schema, to it's pictorial presentation, i.e. internal time. It's very noteworthy, that time is here interpreted as the matter of the internal sense, and as such purely a priori. This keeps time in the region of mere thinking, like Descartes' “res cogitans”, where it for Kant gives itself it's own continuity, instead of anything outside the thinking subject.
                         This way Kant tried to avoid the problem of Descartes's proof for God. A different solution to the question of time as merely an internal sense's matter, would also change the way Kant's conception of a priori can be considered acceptable. This doesn't mean that Descartes's solution to the problem of temporal dependence outside of the thinking subject could be considered right, i.e. platonic substance in it's theoretical sense. It must still be explained more clearly, why this question indeed is the crux deciding Kant's philosophy.
                         As the towards-which of all categories, internal succession of time, as counting, e.g. 1...2...3… and not 3, which would here be only the schema for formal quantity. This successive one-after-another as internal sense as a transcendental schema is more accurately based on the subject's a priori multiplicity and unity. The counting provides the matter for the form of subject in it's unity as understanding, where the matter is the subject's image as time. Time as the successive addition of one-after-another is not counting mathematical numbers, which I use only as an example, since such counting is according to Kant based on the subject's differing through it's time. Being the “of the same kind” in this succesion, subject becomes an image for itself, of which it's schema is this multiplicity brought in to union in the mere subject, i.e. a kind of would-be pure understanding without towards-which. Such understanding without towards-which as the what-content would not be pure understanding.
                         Without towards-which provided as the matter by internal succession of time, pure understanding would have no concept, since it would be a “predicate“ without it's content as about-what, and so it would not be a concept of pure understanding, i.e. a category. This would contradict the very concept Kant has for 'predicate'. As such, it would be “the first subject”, of which “nothing can be made” and which is for us a mere “nothing”, since it would be “only logical”, i.e. without any object corresponding it. Kant even uses here the word 'predicate' in stead of 'category', as 'praedicamentum' was the latin translation for the greek word 'katēgoria'. This “nothing” would be a mere 'dicamentum', without the 'prae-', i.e. before-what it is said and as such merely an empty term, and not a concept in Kant's meaning for a predicate, which is in line with the original meaning of Aristotle. Rather, this would be a mere self as pure reason, even though as pure reason it would not differ in it's possibility and actuality, as it necessarily does in critical philosophy.
                          For Kant this “object” in it's merely inner sense, is consciousness, which is collected in it's succession as pictorial time to a schematic unity, towards-which the self as pure understanding is. As such, the successive manifold of successive internal consciousnesses is brought before pure understanding's “first self”, constituting the categorical understanding as self-consciousness, having consciousness as it's form's content is predicative and thus not “nothing”. Hegel is quite right in calling Kant's substrate a self-consciousness, but this would be right only for Kant's philosophy and not his system of philosophy. This question has implications for the whole of Kant's philosophy of system, since it's the principle of the so called synthetic a priori judgements.
                        Kant's book Critique of pure reason, of which I've dealt only with one chapter, concerns only one part of Kant's philosophy as the critique of pure reason, i.e. the theoretical use of pure reason, which as practical would be quite different. Nevertheless, this one questions is decisive for the whole system even in reason's practical use, since it's theoretical use as understanding considers the possibility of the practical use of reason from the viewpoint of understanding. If, or rather since, the schema of possibility, which is also based on the subjectivity of “res cogitans”, is flawed in Kant's philosophy, also the actuality of this possibility as practical reason must be flawed. This whould also lead to another kind of interpretation of a priori, e.g. as a part of the history of being.
                        The schema of possibility is the agreement of the unity of different representations with the conditions of time, e.g. opposites can't exist at the same time in the same thing, but only after another. Since this is the philosophical possibility for the transition from the theoretical use of reason as a priori philosophy to pure practical use of reason as it's actuality, Kant's 'Noumenon' as the end of this transition in the total system, is conditioned through it's concept of possibility as impossible. This is contrary to Kant's belief, since it's necessary to exclude the intelligible world of 'Noumenon' even as a possibility, leaving only the phenomenal world standing. This leaves it standing, not even on the grave of the intelligible thing-in-itself, but on the grave of the living phenomenal itself. Concerning the old theological debate mentioned, if natural theology, even in the wide sense of Kant's moral reason indeed fails, it should give lutherans some philosophical leverage over natural religions. :D
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Re: Religion and Kant's transcendental schematism

Postby Insanus » Sat Oct 20, 2018 5:28 pm

I'm very puzzled and fascinated by Kant's transcendental aesthetic e.g.the idea that space and time are not derived from experience, but are the form of intuition.

Especially time is confusing. It's been a while since I read Being and Time, but I recall that Heidegger insisted that the problem of time had nothing to do with scientist's problem of measuring (that is, counting) time. I think the book ended when he was starting to get to the point.

Often times I wonder about the relationship between memory and time. I mean, it makes sense to think that I count 1....2...3 only if I remember the 1. Speed of light has no memory, thus no delay, thus nothing happens, but to us it seems to be quite "fast". I've understood that light-years refer to both distance and time, but what that time means remains bizarre to me. We use clocks to refer to the relative movement between earth and the sun, but that does not need the concept of time at all: there's just that, relative movements. I've heard people have made more accurate clocks using constants like some radioactive decay or something, but it doesn't seem to change anything. Movement here, movement there. Sure someone can say "but they move at the same time!". But I remain confused. "Same time" doesn't add any information about anything. They move, we perceive a relation. Where is time? To say:" it IS this perceived relation" seems to be the same as equating time with memory. I'm not sure about this, but would anything really change if instead of talking about events in time, we'd talk about events in memory?
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Alfalfa

Re: Religion and Kant's transcendental schematism

Postby Alfalfa » Sat Oct 20, 2018 9:41 pm

Insanus wrote: Speed of light has no memory, thus no delay, thus nothing happens, but to us it seems to be quite "fast". I've understood that light-years refer to both distance and time, but what that time means remains bizarre to me.
I quite agree, that the problem of time isn't philosophically the same as with the physical definition of time, since physics have presuppositions, which they do not themselves provide or even research, e.g. the ability to form and retain concepts of exact magnitudes, which certainly are not found in nature, even less from a laboratory room. This is quite like the history of zero in mathematics: considering the goals of mathematics, no-one needs to know it and it can't be mathematically deduced, even though it's historically true. Even so, I wouldn't conclude that light has no memory of any kind, since matter can have effects backwards in time, i.e. a quantum entangled photon can erase the results of it's counterpart, which had formed before it, as if the earlier result had never happened. This can happen without known physical interaction between the two, so that the results of the first event will change according to the later event, e.g. if the the first photon had already been measured as a particle, but the latter photon goes through some mirrors so that it gives a diffraction pattern, this later result will change the result of the first photon into a diffraction pattern, even though they measure in different place and time :lol:
Alfalfa

Re: Religion and Kant's transcendental schematism

Postby Alfalfa » Sun Oct 21, 2018 2:05 am

Insanus wrote:I'm very puzzled and fascinated by Kant's transcendental aesthetic e.g.the idea that space and time are not derived from experience, but are the form of intuition. Especially time is confusing. It's been a while since I read Being and Time, but I recall that Heidegger insisted that the problem of time had nothing to do with scientist's problem of measuring (that is, counting) time. I think the book ended when he was starting to get to the point. [...] Where is time? To say:" it IS this perceived relation" seems to be the same as equating time with memory. I'm not sure about this, but would anything really change if instead of talking about events in time, we'd talk about events in memory?
Time indeed is confusing. It's rather quite a reasonable attitude towards time. Rather, the one's thinking they have it all cleared out, are more confused than ever. Puzzling is near having a problem, even though a puzzle might be only a test, game or even a toy. How, why, etc. should and can a person take on the problem of time? It's certainly a reasonable question and deserves seriousness, not only as a test, game or a toy, a sort of “vana curiositas“. Maybe it's more like Heraclitus says: it's time that toys with us. So, has time rather taken on us to have itself tossed (blēma) before (pro) us as such a problem? Who grasps and what here? At least some points can and even should be philosophically made concerning time. For example, what or how is this concern, am I concerned about it and does it have even a somewhat philosophically explicable “structure“, what ever that means? Of course, such an attempt has been made about the concern of time, even though philosophy certainly might not be everybody's concern, at least not consciously. Nevertheless, this curiosity might as well turn out to be in vain and for vain.
                        To make a long talk shorter, let's have a little “fabula docet “. A long philosophical talk, the “makros logos“ is anyways usually considered slavish and maybe it is. In an old fable by Hyginus Heidegger saw a prephilosophical interpretation of time as concern (Sorge), which in latin is 'cura'. This old fable tells, that when man was being created, three divine beings all wanted their share: Spirit (spiritum), Life (vixerit) and Body (corpus), which were given and embodied by the figures of Zeus, Cura and Gaia. Here's man's being wandering between the past and the future as a heavy cloud. Since there was a controversy about the name of man, he was to be called 'homo', since he was made of soil (humo), i.e. man is a humble being. There's nothing as humbling as death as the end of even our thinking of such an end. When we puzzle about it, time is a concern for us, but it's not just any concern. Rather, at least for younger Heidegger, our being concerned about time is the very being of time. T. S. Elliot writes in one of his most famous poems:
And indeed there will be time
For the yellow smoke that slides along the street,
Rubbing its back upon the window-panes;
There will be time, there will be time
To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet;
There will be time to murder and create,
And time for all the works and days of hands
That lift and drop a question on your plate;
Time for you and time for me,
And time yet for a hundred indecisions,
And for a hundred visions and revisions,
Before the taking of a toast and tea.
There will be time, but what kind of willing is time, or rather to have time? Nietzsche would probably say, that time is the blink of an eye, the 'Augenblick', which always wills itself as such and so finds itself from it's past and future. For Kant, such a blink contains a possibility for choosing between the demonic nothingness of having one's final end in time, i.e. dying the death, but also of choosing the ever growing light-hearted godly laughter given by heaven, the childish wisdom to view even the demonic as a senile error grown too rigid to change it's course anymore. Hegel thought that feelings like anxiety (Angst) aren't filled with real content, but Heidegger had it otherwise. It's more likely that certain type of philosophy rises out of anxiety, the will to tarry in time, have a while to rest one's mind, as Aristotle's 'anapausis' as a free game, i.e. the 'quiescentia' of the philosophical lifestyle serving no other ends. Here's another one from T. S. Eliot:
When Lil’s husband got demobbed, I said—
I didn’t mince my words, I said to her myself,
HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
Now Albert’s coming back, make yourself a bit smart.
He’ll want to know what you done with that money he gave you
To get yourself some teeth. He did, I was there.
You have them all out, Lil, and get a nice set,
He said, I swear, I can’t bear to look at you.
And no more can’t I, I said, and think of poor Albert,
He’s been in the army four years, he wants a good time,
And if you don’t give it him, there’s others will, I said.
Oh is there, she said. Something o’ that, I said.
Then I’ll know who to thank, she said, and give me a straight look.
HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
If you don’t like it you can get on with it, I said.
Others can pick and choose if you can’t.
But if Albert makes off, it won’t be for lack of telling.
You ought to be ashamed, I said, to look so antique.
(And her only thirty-one.)
I can’t help it, she said, pulling a long face,
It’s them pills I took, to bring it off, she said.
(She’s had five already, and nearly died of young George.)
The chemist said it would be all right, but I’ve never been the same.
You are a proper fool, I said.
Well, if Albert won’t leave you alone, there it is, I said,
What you get married for if you don’t want children?
HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
Well, that Sunday Albert was home, they had a hot gammon,
And they asked me in to dinner, to get the beauty of it hot—
HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
Goonight Bill. Goonight Lou. Goonight May. Goonight.
Ta ta. Goonight. Goonight.
Good night, ladies, good night, sweet ladies, good night, good night.
The context of these lines is the last call, i.e. closing time in a bar. There's certain kind of sorrow, which could dissolve in the morning light, if such was, but some night-time illusions can't be avoided, since whiling away and tarrying in the deepness of the old and deep midnight one can't, or rather won't be sure. To paraphrase Nietzsche's Zarathustra, midnight has a voice of it's own, a sigh of it's own and a laughter of drunken midnight-death happiness. Here is the midnight brightest, it ruminates in woe, or in a dream, but still more is it joy and cheers up the old heart. Here pain is also a joy, curse is also a blessing, night is also a sun and sage is a fool. It wants drunken midnight, it wants graves and grave-tears' consolation. So speaks that midnight clock and Nietzsche's language is here quite on point, since some things can't be discussed like one advertises herrings on the marketplace. Even Heidegger eventually abandoned the project of Being and time, since he felt he was being somewhat betrayed by the language of more traditional and metaphysical philosophy. On a happy, or rather an ass-headed occasion, one could view time like the drunken haze of a midsummer night's sleep:
God’s my life, stol'n hence, and left me asleep? I have had a most rare vision. I have had a dream—past the wit of man to say what dream it was. Man is but an ass if he go about to expound this dream. Methought I was—there is no man can tell what. Methought I was, and methought I had—but man is but a patched fool if he will offer to say what methought I had. The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man’s hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report what my dream was. I will get Peter Quince to write a ballad of this dream. It shall be called “Bottom’s Dream” because it hath no bottom. And I will sing it in the latter end of a play before the duke. Peradventure, to make it the more gracious, I shall sing it at her death.
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Re: Religion and Kant's transcendental schematism

Postby Insanus » Sun Oct 21, 2018 3:57 pm

Heidegger's concern and Nietzsche's augenblick seem to hint that the question of time could be understood as waiting-to-be-ready-to-die, or counting-towards-end. The decisiveness that means to be ready to die would be beyond time (as waiting/counting) psychologically, moving more like light, to use that analogy. This augenblick-life has different meaning for time, it does not mean continuity anymore. In J.Krishamurti's sense (psychological) time can end because of this (I think he means something like this augenblick when talking about the end of time. Also, if time is the a priori form of intuition, wouldn't death be the end of time quite literally?)), Very similar idea is introduced also in Nefastos' books. That when subject is no longer concerned with his own continuity he enters a new state of being, or takes an initiation in N:s language.

The willing to have time is perhaps to avoid the possibility of impossibility: to fear/avoid/deny death. The being concerned with time avoids the error signals of traumatizing reality, the breaks in artificial psychological order?
Myrkky sattuu siihen jolla on haava.
Alfalfa

Re: Religion and Kant's transcendental schematism

Postby Alfalfa » Mon Oct 22, 2018 12:00 am

Insanus wrote:Heidegger's concern and Nietzsche's augenblick seem to hint that the question of time could be understood as waiting-to-be-ready-to-die, or counting-towards-end. The decisiveness that means to be ready to die would be beyond time (as waiting/counting) psychologically, moving more like light, to use that analogy. This augenblick-life has different meaning for time, it does not mean continuity anymore. In J.Krishamurti's sense (psychological) time can end because of this (I think he means something like this augenblick when talking about the end of time. Also, if time is the a priori form of intuition, wouldn't death be the end of time quite literally?)), Very similar idea is introduced also in Nefastos' books. That when subject is no longer concerned with his own continuity he enters a new state of being, or takes an initiation in N:s language.
The willing to have time is perhaps to avoid the possibility of impossibility: to fear/avoid/deny death. The being concerned with time avoids the error signals of traumatizing reality, the breaks in artificial psychological order?
In the way I presented it, they are quite alike, although Nietzsche's 'Augenblick' is somewhat different from Heidegger's. For Nietzsche, the blink of an eye is the eternal recurrence of the same. For Nietzsche, it's there not at least explicitly about time that is 'moribundus'. Heidegger's 'Dasein' is indeed coming to it's end, no matter if it wills this or not. It can only forget itself in to inauthenticity, e.g. in the world of everyday talk, as if this forgetfulness would save 'Dasein' from it's boundedness to it's very end. As Nietzsche also quite right says, this is the time when it feels like one has all the more to say to others, even though the time is pressing on and behind all that clamour waits the vast ocean of “empty“ silence. What Nietzsche means by eternal recurrence should fail , if my time indeed will come to an end, but how does he understand the relationship of death and eternal recurrence? Zarathustra says, that he himself wills the free death, “den freien Tod, der mir kommt, weil ich will“. In this comes the “letzten Augenblick“, which wills not another blink of an eye, since it would be like a dryed out garland. Here the one which comes is the death, but this also is willed by him. Nietzsche and Heidegger agree that people in general give only little thought about death, because they usually don't wantto think about it. This makes Nietzsche happy and he would like to turn people's thoughts on life even more, as hundred times more worthy of thought. As Kant reasonably says, dying the death makes man a 'Nichtswürdiger' who doesn't have value in his final destination. Nietzsche would seem all happy about forgetting death, by letting it vanish in the unconscious like the dead buried beneath the soil. Eternal recurrence doesn't quite seem to comply with the free willed death, since there 'Augenblick' will's it's own end, not it's eternity. Here it's all about me, e.g. not blessing the oaths of others living. Even if death comes, it should for Nietzsche not come as a failure but victory, but then such victory goes against eternal recurrence as the most worthy willing, since either end of time would be willed and not eternity, or the will would fail in the end. These thoughts of Nietzsche might not be completely thought out, especially since for him dying the death was not worthy of thought. It seems that Nietzsche eventually indeed happily forgot to think about death at all as the 'Totenstille', since he valued thought of life hundred times more, even with it's death-clock.
                                  For the younger Heidegger it's all about remembering death as the finality of also philosophical thinking. Here it's thought, that an escape from concern is only a modification of concern, i.e. a concern for not knowing what concern already is always about. This original concern about death gives a person motive to escape from himself into a would-be careless whiling away, even if it's deception. In this way a person comes first time depenndent on timely care by trying to take distance of it, i.e. like a person trying to escape himself. To give an example, it's like the relationship between 'boat' and “shipwrecked boat“, since here 'shipwrecked' depends on 'boat'. There's all the more to say about death the less it's being talked around in such a manner. This resoluteness indeed goes beyong the numbered time. It's mainly Aristotle's notion of time as numbered (arithmoumenon) how time is even today usually thought, even though Aristotle's notions are of course a bit more complex. According to him time always connects to motion as belonging to it and it's the numbered difference between former and latter of the quantity of motion. This timing of motion can happen and even primarily happens even in mind without sensing anything external. Time is numbered motion by the before and after, i.e. one-after-another. Through counting 'now' divides in to two and since there are two nows instead of one, the counting has added up one-after-another to two in total, one before and two after, or rather first one and second two. Kant's notion of time is quite like Aristotle's: time as the a priori matter is counting, which is summed up in the schema of count. Since the counting has gone through one-after-another, it's schema is multiplicity and it's category quantity. Quantity applies to a manifold with different homogenous parts which are held together as a whole, e.g. as number 3 consists of three separate homogenous 1's held together in unity.
                                  Why does Heidegger insist, that time is not a numbered quantity according to before and after, one-after-another? The most obvious point is, that it's doesn't say a word about my time, i.e. it has totally lost sight of the fact, that even such counting would eventually come to an end. This is not a direct contradiction, since my time could be added as counting's finity. It's not like Aristotle's or Kant's definition of time presupposes it's eternity only because it's counted. Another reason for Heidegger to go against this view of time is, that the count takes account only of things thought as being-at-hand, even though time is rather the presencing, i.e. it's not only the different now's, which are thought as identical units of a sequence of nows, even though each of them are presenced in an 'Augenblick'. Even this is not critically important, since Aristotle and Kant could whould probably answer, that Heidegger is talking about movement and not time. I think Heidegger's critique is rather directed against how for both Aristotle and Kant, the a priori subject gives itself time as an internal motion, which is based on the differentation of the self in to self-consciousness as internal time. It rather always has to be time and movement, since the subject here gives itself before it's self as the multiplicity of it's before-and-after. This before-and-after as a priori time of course presupposes movement, but it's not really important, since it will always be the count of a manifold from the subject's side. For Aristotle, the a priori subject's self-identity provides continuity to different times as the undivided 'now' as pure 'nous' in every counted sequence of nows, which makes them a quantity (megethos) consisting of homogenous units. Also with Kant, time is a quantity as the manifold of homogenous units, i.e. a priori subject's pure self giving itself as a manifold in time. The pure self multiplies to a sequence of consciousness' as time, which are given unity as the categorical towards-which, i.e. self-consciousness as the self in it's manifold image. The a priori subject is even a priori made something which can't be in time, since time is the whole in it's unity and only the images of pure self are “in“ time as it's parts. So in this conception of self, or the so called first subject, it's left totally outside time as the pure a priori in itself without any content. For Kant, time as an a priori form of intuition can never be the end of self.
                                    Since it's philosophically supposed to be all about the a priori of time, it's more of a coincidence that this “self“ as the 'substantia' of all a posteriori “phenomenal“ time, e.g. measuring the movement of clock's pointer, is something always being-at-hand returning to itself in perfect homogeneity, in imitation of the first clocks, i.e. sun and stars, and as such can serve as a public time measurement device in it's continual being-at-hand with it's identical units. Here time of nature is thought as deathless, based on a conception of a self outside time, as if such a time of death would never come also for my self. One should then answer with Heidegger, that the time of “nature“, i.e. being-in-the-world, dies with me even though it's not subjective time in Kant's sense.

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